One of the most important and challenging theories of Open Theism is its particular view of the attribute of Divine Omniscience. This theory acknowledges that God is the Absolute, yet stipulates that God's knowledge does not include what man performs with his free will in the future. The acceptance of absolute authority for man and the embracing of the contradiction between the "freely chosen actions of man in the future" and the "foreknowledge of God" have led the Open Theism to deny the foreknowledge of God in these acts. At the same time, they argue that the lack of “ a priori knowledge of God” in these kinds of actions does not undermine his absolute knowledge. Advocates of open theism, proving their own viewpoints by referring to all kinds of views on God's knowledge and expressing the deficiencies in these theories, maintain that this view is more acceptable logically and philosophically, and due to its compatibility with the Holy Bible. While mentioning the shortcomings of three other contending perspectives in this regard namely "simple knowledge", "middle knowledge" and "Augustinian-Calvinist view ", they consolidate their views and establish their own theory.

The conflict between Divine foreknowledge and human free will is a major controversy within theology and philosophy of religion. Needless to say, the proper notion of time and its relation to God is essential for coping with this conflict. Based on this notion, there are three solutions to the conflict including “indeterminacy of the future”, “unknowability of future free acts”, and “Timelessness of Divine knowledge”. In this paper, I shall begin by evaluation of the first two theories and show how they cannot settle the conflict. I shall, then, assess the third theory and show that it is the most successful one. Besides, the theories of some Christian philosophers like Thomas Aquinas, Anselm and Boethius are explained in light of the thoughts of Islamic philosophers, especially Qazi Saeed al-Qumi.

In his book, The God Who Risks, John Sanders tries to reach an adequate resolution to the conflict between Divine foreknowledge and human free will. He admits God’ s Omniscience but denies His exhaustive definite foreknowledge of future events. Sanders calls this “ dynamic Omniscience” . According to this view, future events are not knowable and are epistemologically open; So, Divine foreknowledge is not logically possible. God knows all there is to know, but Omniscience does not require foreknowledge. God may give a forecast of what he thinks will occur based on his exhaustive knowledge of past and present factors, but such predictions are always open to the possibility that God might be mistaken about some points. Just as omnipotence is not denied by saying that God cannot do the logically impossible, so too Omniscience is not denied by saying that God cannot foreknow the logically unknowable. This article is an exposition and critical evaluation of Sanders’ s view.

Patrick Grim has presented an argument against the compatibility of Divine Omniscience. Citing Cantor's Theorem and using the accepted definition of Omniscience -knowledge of all true propositions- Grim denies the existence of an Omniscient due to the impossibility of a set that includes all true propositions. Grim's argument raised many answers by Christian philosophers. For example, Plantinga has objected to this argument by showing its self-contradictoriness. Although there are fundamental differences between Islamic and Christian theology in explaining the nature of Omniscience, considering the capacity of Sadra's transcendent wisdom, by citing issues such as the definition and nature of collection as well as the conditions of impossible sequence, addition to refuting Grim's argument that there are more facts than the set of all facts, the possibility of the knowledge of Omniscient to an infinite series of sets of facts can be proved.

Abstract"Omniscience" is an attributes of classical theism that affects how it is understood in other doctrines of classical theology, such as immutability, God's Free Will, and man's Free Will. Swinburne, the contemporary English philosopher of religion, argues that the classical notion of Omniscience is not coherent, but incompatible with human free will, God's free will, the first- person propositions, the Tense propositions, and ultimately the scripture; therefore, he has gone beyond the classical notion of "Omniscience" and has provided a more modified explanation of this concept.He believes that because the knowledge of God is limited or because of logical rules; Or because of plans that God has not yet decided; Or God Himself has limited His knowledge, He does not diminish His worship. But Swinburne's modified of Omniscient theory does not seem to be compatible with other attributes of God, such as creative. It can be said that Swinburne has erred in stating that knowledge is limited to Propositional knowledge and considers knowledge of God to be of that type; because in addition to Propositional knowledge, intuitive knowledge can be obtained and God's knowledge can be considered as such. Because Swinburne considers God to be temporal; When God has imposed this restriction on himself, there can be no preference to a specific time.

One of the traditional theistic beliefs is the belief in God’s absolute attributes. One of these absolute attributes is “Omniscience”. But there are some challenges concerning this attribute and one of them addresses indexical propositions. Among all kinds of indexicals de presenti -propositions that inform about present time, the de se propositions are considered by philosophers. Philosophers who criticize Omniscience use these propositions in different ways. In this article, these challenges and responses to them will be scrutinized.De presenti propositions are troublesome for traditional theism because it seems that the knowledge of different present moments causes a change in God and this contradicts God’s immutability. For example, if God knows that “it is 9 a.m. now”, then He should know “it is 10 a.m. now” an hour later. So, His knowledge changes from time to time which means God Himself changes.There are some responses to this problem:1- To change de presenti propositions to non-indexical ones. For example, the audiences of The Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy of Iran could say: “Today, the Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy was declared” or say: “The Proclamation of Constitutional Monarchy is declared on August 5, 1906”. Therefore, the knowledge of such propositions is fixed through time.2- To claim that God is timeless. That is, God is outside the boundaries of time and His knowledge of different moments, unlike human beings, is immutable.3- Final solution: to modify the interpretation of the concept of God. Theologians traditionally have presupposed that any kind of change in an absolutely perfect being brings it down from its absolute perfection. But this is not so clear. It can be shown that some changes in God, including changes in His knowledge of different moments, do not affect His perfection.Also, knowledge of de se propositions like “I’m in the hospital”, is challenging for God being Omniscient because only the person who utters such propositions, not God, can know them.There are some responses to this problem:1- To distinguish between the content of a proposition and the proposition itself. Although “I’m in the hospital” can only be explained by the patient himself, it indicates a situation in the world, that is, that person X is in the hospital, which can also be explained by other people. Although God's knowledge does not belong to the de se propositions themselves, it belongs to the content of such propositions,2- Theists can claim that knowledge does not belong to propositions themselves, but belongs to their truth. In such a case, the Omniscient can know “I’m in the hospital” is true.3- Final solution: to modify the interpretation of the concept of God. According to this solution, theists can consider what atheists put forward against Omniscience not as a denial of the existence of God, but as an illumination of the concept of God, and by accepting it, restrict the extension of the absolute knowledge of God.In this article, we first try to show that some of the objections against solutions for the problem of indexicals could be avoided. So, responses like God’s timelessness or distinction between a proposition and its content can overcome the problem. At the same time, the final solution in each part, which is to modify the interpretation of the concept of God, is a way for those who think other responses do not work.